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Abstract
We study games in which principals simultaneously post mechanisms in the presence of sev-
eral agents. We evaluate the role of principals’ communication in these settings. As in Myerson
(1982), each principal may generate incomplete information among agents by sending them pri-
vate signals. We show that this channel of communication, which has not been considered in
standard approaches to competing mechanisms, has relevant strategic effects. Specifically, we
construct an example of a complete information game in which (multiple) equilibria are sus-
tained as in Yamashita (2010) and none of them survives in games in which all principals can
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1 Introduction
We study competing mechanism games: principals compete through mechanisms in the presence of
several agents. Such a strategic scenario has become a reference framework to model competition
in a large number of market settings.1
As first pointed out by McAfee (1993) and Peck (1997), the equilibrium allocations derived in
these contexts crucially depend on the set of mechanisms that principals are allowed to post. Typ-
ically, letting agents communicate to principals additional information on top of their exogenous
types supports additional allocations at equilibrium.2 This raises the issue of identifying a class of
mechanisms inducing agents to reveal all their available information. In an important contribution,
Epstein and Peters (1999) introduce a communication device that incorporates the market informa-
tion generated by the competing mechanisms posted by principals. In their general construction, a
mechanism for a principal requires each agent to send messages from a universal type space. The
corresponding set of equilibrium allocations may be very large: Yamashita (2010) has been the
first to show that restricting attention to a subset of such mechanisms, i.e. the recommendation
mechanisms, is sufficient to derive a folk-theorem-like result. In a recommendation mechanism, a
principal commits to post a certain direct mechanism if all but one agent recommend him to do so.
Recommendation mechanisms hence allow to construct a flexible system of punishments: following
a unilateral deviation of a given principal, agents can coordinate to select, amongst his opponents’
decisions, those inducing the most severe punishment to the deviator. As a result, any incentive
compatible allocation yielding each principal a payoff above a given threshold can be supported at
equilibrium, if there are at least three agents.
The present work reconsiders the effect of communication between principals and agents on equi-
librium allocations taking a more traditional mechanism design perspective. That is, we evaluate
the strategic role of a principal privately communicating with agents in the spirit of the canonical
construction of Myerson (1982). The above-mentioned approaches to competing mechanisms disre-
gard this possibility. Indeed, they restrict principals to communicate by posting public mechanisms,
which implement decisions contingent on the private messages received from agents. Yet, to the
extent that he cannot directly contract on his opponents’ mechanisms, a single principal may in
principle gain by sending private signals to agents so to correlate their behaviors with the decisions
1Applications include competing auctions (McAfee, 1993; Peters and Severinov, 1997; Viràg, 2010), competitive
search (Moen, 1997; Guerrieri et al., 2010) and competition in financial markets (Biais et al., 2000; Attar et al., 2011),
among many others.
2This result, which has been documented in single-agent contexts by Martimort and Stole (2002) and Peters
(2001), is often acknowledged as a failure of the revelation principle in games with multiple principals.
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of all principals. We show that this channel of communication has relevant strategic effects.
We establish our result in the simple framework in which principals compete to attract agents
under complete information, and each agent only takes an observable action. In such a scenario,
we construct an example with two principals and three agents and explicitly characterize the set of
equilibrium allocations supportable by recommendation mechanisms. In a next step, we show that
none of the corresponding equilibria survives when all principals can send private signals to agents.
By privately communicating with agents, a principal can make them differently informed of his
final decisions. This uncertainty, which cannot be reproduced by standard stochastic mechanisms
without signals, crucially affects the continuation game played by agents. We exploit this insight
to construct a mechanism with private communication yielding a principal a payoff greater than
any of those available without private communication. The result obtains despite the fact that his
opponent also sends private signals and delegates to the agents the choice of the (worst) punishment
against his mechanism. In the context of the example, this shows that the set of equilibrium
allocations supportable by mechanisms with private signals for principals and the set of those
supported by mechanisms which do not involve such private communication are disjoint. Finally,
we characterize an equilibrium allocation supported by mechanisms with signals, which shows that
this enlarged game admits an equilibrium. Yet, equilibrium allocations are typically not unique as
we shortly discuss.
A direct implication of our main result is that the equilibria characterized by allowing only
agents to privately communicate through possibly large message spaces, as in Epstein and Peters
(1999), may not be robust against unilateral deviations towards mechanisms featuring principals’
private communication. This in turn indicates that such signals may need to be included in any
canonical system of communication, which calls for more theoretical work to identify a correspond-
ing canonical set of equilibrium mechanisms.
To the extent that agents’ observable actions can naturally be interpreted as participation
decisions, the setting of the example is common to a large number of applications of competing
mechanism models in which agents’ participation decisions are strategic.3 Alternatively, our exam-
ple can be reconciled with economic models of competing mechanisms under complete information,
in which agents participate with all principals and principals post incentive schemes that assign a
decision to each profile of agents’ observable actions. This is, for instance, the approach followed by
Prat and Rustichini (2003) to model the lobbying process in the presence of several policy makers.
3We detail this interpretation in Section 4. Observe that participation is strategic in all the applications mentioned
in Footnote 1.
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Under complete information, these incentive schemes are interpreted as direct mechanisms. As we
discuss in Section 4, an implication of our analysis is that the restriction to such direct mecha-
nisms is problematic once principals are allowed to design more sophisticated ones. This stands in
contrast with the result of Han (2007), who establishes the robustness of equilibria supported by
direct mechanisms against unilateral deviations to indirect ones in competing mechanism games
of complete information. Yet, he only considers mechanisms, which allow agents to send private
messages to principals but do not allow principals to send them private signals, a restriction that
we prove to be critical.
Our analysis can be casted within the framework of Yamashita (2010) once agents’ actions are
taken into account. An important limitation of Yamashita (2010) is the focus on deterministic
behaviors. That is, agents play pure strategies in every continuation equilibrium, and principals
cannot post random contracts. Szentes (2010) shows that the latter restriction is critical for the
validity of Yamashita (2010)’s main result by exhibiting equilibrium allocations supported by deter-
ministic mechanisms that yield a principal a payoff below Yamashita (2010)’s relevant threshold.4
We admit instead random contracts and mixed strategy equilibria in the agents’ continuation game.
In our complete information example, if principals do not privately communicate with agents, rec-
ommendation mechanisms allow to re-establish a folk-theorem result in the spirit of Yamashita
(2010).
Several folk-theorem results have recently been established in the competing mechanism lit-
erature. Generalizing the approach of Yamashita (2010), Peters and Troncoso-Valverde (2013)
construct an abstract framework in which all players have commitment power and (privately)
communicate with each other. The equilibrium distributions over players’ decisions can also be
correlated, due to the presence of a public correlating device. Under complete information, they
show that all the allocations characterized by Yamashita (2010) are supported at equilibrium, to-
gether with those arising due to (public) correlation. We consider, instead, the situation in which
only a subset of players (the principals) is able to commit while the remaining ones (the agents) take
actions given the mechanisms. In this context, we allow each principal to correlate his decisions to
the signals he privately sends to each agent. This feature drastically affects equilibrium analysis,
since none of the allocations characterized by recommendation mechanisms can now be supported
at equilibrium.
A different strategy is followed by Kalai et al. (2010), Peters and Szentes (2012), Peters (2015),
and Szentes (2015) who provide attempts at modeling contractible contracts. These works show
4See Peters (2014) for a discussion.
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that by posting contracts that directly refer to each other, a principal may successfully deter his
opponents’ deviations. A folk theorem may hence obtain even if no communication takes place
after mechanisms are posted, which limits the strategic role of agents and the power of the private
communication we exploit.
The feature that principals can send private signals to agents is also key in the literature
on information design with multiple senders in which signals affect agents’ posterior probabilities
over an unknown state of the world. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2017a,b) consider a Bayesian
persuasion game with a single receiver in which each sender’s set of signals is sufficiently large to
include signals that are effectively correlated with those of the other senders. Koessler et al. (2018)
extend this approach in several directions, including the presence of multiple receivers, and focus on
uncorrelated signals. We take a more traditional mechanism design perspective in which principals
do not hold any private information and send signals to affect agents’ beliefs over their realized
decisions, which induces correlated outcomes at equilibrium. Our results hold for arbitrarily rich
sets of signals available to principals.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces a general competing mechanism model,
Section 3 presents our example, Section 4 provides a discussion, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We study extensive form games of complete information in which J ≥ 2 principals deal with
I ≥ 2 agents. Each agent i = 1, 2, · · · , I takes an action ai from a finite set Ai, and we denote
a =
(
a1, . . . , aI
)
∈ A = I×
i=1
Ai. Let Yj be the finite set of decisions available to principal j with
generic element yj ∈ Yj , and Y =
J×
j=1
Yj . The payoff functions of agent i and of principal j are
given by ui : A× Y → R and vj : A× Y → R, respectively.
Agents’ actions are observable, so each principal j can choose a decision yj contingent on the
array a. We denote αj : A1×...×AI −→ ∆(Yj) an incentive scheme for principal j, with ∆(Yj) being
the set of probability distributions over Yj . An incentive scheme specifies a (possibly stochastic)
decision for every array of observed actions. We let Yj be the set of incentive schemes for principal
j, with αj ∈ Yj and Y =
J×
j=1
Yj .
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2.1 Competing mechanism games: equilibrium
We first introduce the standard approach to model communication in competing mechanisms games
of complete information, absent any moral hazard.5 In this framework, communication takes place
via the private messages sent by agents to principals, and via the public mechanisms principals
commit to. Specifically, we let mij ∈ M ij be a message privately sent by agent i to principal j. A
mechanism for principal j is the mapping γj : Mj → Yj , in which Mj =
I×
i=1
M ij is the set of message
profiles that principal j receives from agents, with typical element mj =
(
m1j , . . . ,m
I
j
)
. We denote
ΓMjj the set of mechanisms available to principal j, and let ΓM =
J×
j=1
ΓMjj . If each M ij set is a
singleton, then γj corresponds to an incentive scheme αj . In this complete information setting, any
such αj is also referred to as a direct mechanism for principal j.
The competing mechanism game unfolds as follows. First, principals simultaneously post mech-
anisms. Then, agents simultaneously take their communication decisions, which determine a profile
of incentive schemes (α1, ..., αJ). Given the public mechanisms and the messages she sent to prin-
cipals, each agent takes an action, and payoffs are determined. We let µi : ΓM → ∆ (M i) be the
message strategy of agent i, with M i =
J×
j=1
M ij , and ηi : ΓM ×M i → ∆
(
Ai
)
be her action strategy.
We take βi = (µi, ηi) to be a strategy for agent i, and β = (β1, . . . , βI) a profile of strategies. A
pure strategy for principal j is a mechanism γj ∈ ΓMjj . We let U i(γj , γ−j , β) and Vj(γj , γ−j , β) be
the corresponding expected utilities for agent i and principal j, respectively. We denote GM the
game in which agents send messages to principals through the sets (M1, ...,M I) and principals post
mechanisms γ = (γj , γ−j) ∈ ΓM . We consider the subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of GM
in which principals play pure strategies. The agents’ strategies β = (βi, β−i) constitute a continu-
ation equilibrium relative to ΓM if, for every i and for every γ ∈ ΓM , βi maximizes U i (γ, βi, β−i)
given β−i. The strategies (γ, β) constitute a SPNE in GM if β is a continuation equilibrium and
if, given γ−j and β, for every j = 1, . . . , J : γj ∈ argmax
γ′j∈Γ
Mj
j
Vj
(
γ′j , γ−j , β
)
. That is, at the stage of
designing his mechanism, each principal must anticipate the Nash equilibrium of the agents’ game
induced by the whole array of principals’ mechanisms.
As first documented by McAfee (1993) and Peck (1997), the set of equilibrium allocations of such
games is crucially affected by the characteristics of the message spaces (M1, ...,M I). Letting agents
communicate, on top of their (exogenous) private information, the market information generated by
the presence of several competing mechanisms allows principals to implement additional threats,
5We follow Epstein and Peters (1999), Peters (2001) and Han (2007).
6
thereby supporting additional allocations at equilibrium. Epstein and Peters (1999) construct
the (universal) message spaces that embed this market information. Importantly, the punishments
implemented using such sophisticated agents’ reports against a deviating principal can be replicated
by focusing on a simpler class of mechanisms.6 These are the recommendation mechanisms exhibited
in Yamashita (2010). To properly describe them, let Yj ⊆ M ij for each i and j. That is, let the
message spaces be sufficiently rich to allow every agent to communicate a direct mechanism to each
principal j. Then, γRj is a recommendation mechanism for principal j if:
γRj (m1j , . . . ,mIj ) =
 αj if |
{
i : mij = αj
}
| ≥ I − 1
any α¯j ∈ Yj otherwise.
(1)
A recommendation mechanism can be understood as having agents suggest to a principal the direct
mechanism to be implemented, and having the principal commit to follow any such recommendation
if it is sent by at least I − 1 agents.
2.2 Principals’ private communication: equilibrium and robustness
We now extend the construction above to cope with principals’ private communication. In principle,
there are many ways to enrich communication and incorporate this additional channel. Along the
lines of Myerson (1982), we consider the simple case, in which each principal j sends a private
signal sij ∈ Sij to each agent i after having received agents’ messages mj ∈ Mj . Our aim is to
evaluate whether the equilibrium allocations of a given game GM survive in enlarged games in
which principals can also privately communicate to agents.
A mechanism with signals for principal j is the mapping γˆj : Mj → ∆ (Yj × Sj), in which
Sj =
I×
i=1
Sij is the set of signals available to principal j. Thus, given the messages mj he receives,
γˆj determines a joint probability distribution over principal j’s incentive schemes in Yj and signals
in Sj . As in Myerson (1982), each agent i privately observes the realization of each signal sij , and
revises her prior information accordingly. Since a mechanism with signals for principal j cannot be
made contingent on his opponents’ mechanisms, agent i constructs her posteriors over principal j’s
decisions only relying on the private signal sij she gets from him. We take Γ
MjSj
j to be the set of
mechanisms with signals available to principal j, and denote ΓMS =
J×
j=1
ΓMjSjj .
Mechanisms with signals are publicly observed, but the message from agent i to principal
j and the signal from principal j to agent i are only observed by i and j. Since signals are
6The formal argument is provided in Lemma 2 of Yamashita (2010).
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private, a principal can generate incomplete information among agents at the stage in which they
choose actions. We denote GMS the extensive form game in which principals post mechanisms
γˆ ∈ ΓMS , receive messages from agents through the sets (M1, ...,M I), and send signals through
the sets (S1, ..., SJ). As in any GM game, there are two stages in which agent i moves in a GMS
game. First, having observed the mechanisms γˆ = (γˆ1, . . . , γˆJ), she sends an array of messages
mi =
(
mi1, . . . ,m
i
J
)
to the principals. Second, having observed her private signals si =
(
si1, . . . , s
i
J
)
,
she chooses an action ai. We take µˆi : ΓMS → ∆ (M i) to be the message strategy of agent i and
ηˆi : ΓMS ×M i × Si → ∆ (Ai) to be her strategy in the action game, with Si = J×
j=1
Sij . We let
βˆi = (µˆi, ηˆi) be a strategy for agent i, and we extend the notion of continuation equilibrium given in
Section 3.1, accordingly. For a given profile of mechanisms, agents’ messages, and realized signals,
we hence consider the Nash equilibria of the induced action game. Since, in any GMS game, each
principal may independently correlate his signals with his decisions, the equilibrium distributions
of players’ decisions will typically not be independent.
If there is only one principal, i.e. J = 1, a game GMS corresponds to a complete information
version of the generalized principal-agent problems analyzed in Myerson (1982).7 In that spirit, we
refer to a direct mechanism with signals as to a mechanism in which a principal does not ask for any
message and privately signals to each agent an action to take. Formally, we denote ˆˆγj ∈ ∆(A×Yj)
a direct mechanism with signals and ˆˆΓj ⊆ ΓMjSjj the set of such mechanisms for principal j.
One should observe that, for each (M1, ...,M I), the corresponding game GM can be inter-
preted as a degenerate game GMS in which each Sij set is a singleton. In particular, we can write
ΓMjj ⊆ ΓMjSjj for each j and Sj , and specify any mechanism without signals γj as a degenerate
mechanism with signals γˆj in which, for every pair (mj , a), the probability distribution over Yj
coincides with γj(mj , a) for each sij ∈ Sij .8 Following Epstein and Peters (1999) and Peters (2001),
we say that an equilibrium (γ, β) of GM is robust if, when considering “larger” games in which ad-
ditional mechanisms are feasible, the original equilibrium survives to any unilateral deviation of a
principal toward a more sophisticated mechanism. That is, if there exists at least one continuation
equilibrium of each of these larger games which makes the deviation unprofitable.9
7In Myerson (1982), agents may also have private information and take non-observable actions.
8A similar reasoning is used by Peters (2001) and Han (2007) to specify a direct mechanism as a degenerate
indirect one.
9See Epstein and Peters (1999, p. 133-134), and Peters (2001, p. 1364) for a formal definition.
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3 The role of two-sided private communication: an example
This section establishes our main result. The argument is developed by means of an example which
achieves two distinct objectives. First, it characterizes the equilibrium allocations supported by
recommendation mechanisms. As in the incomplete information scenario of Yamashita (2010), we
get a folk-theorem like result: each incentive feasible allocation yielding each principal a payoff
above a given threshold can be supported at equilibrium. Second, it shows that none of these
allocations can be supported at equilibrium in any game in which all principals can use private
communication.
Consider a setting with five players: two principals, P1 and P2, and three agents, A1, A2
and A3, who take actions in the sets A1 = A2 = {a¯, a} and A3 = {a¯}. Let P1’s decision set be
Y1 = {y11, y12}, and P2’s one be Y2 = {y21, y22}. Payoffs are represented in Table 1, in which
the first two numbers in each cell denote the payoffs to P1 and P2, who respectively choose rows
and columns in the outer matrix. A1 and A2, respectively, choose rows and columns in the inner
matrices. The payoffs to A1, A2 and A3 are represented by the last three numbers in each cell.
y21 y22
a¯ a a¯ a
y11 a¯ (2, 95, 10, 5, 1) (2, ζ, 3/2, 8, 1) a¯ (2, ζ,−1/10, 0, 1) (2, ζ,−1/10, 8, 1)
a (2,−1, 0, 0, 1) (2, ζ, 0, 10, 1) a (2,−1, 5, 5, 1) (2, ζ, 1,−10, 1)
a¯ a a¯ a
y12 a¯ (2, 95, 10, 5, 1) (2, ζ, 3/2, 8, 1) a¯ (2, ζ,−1, 4, 1) (2, ζ,−1, 8, 1)
a (2, 5, 5, 5, 1) (2, ζ,−1, 4, 1) a (2,−1, 0, 0, 1) (2, ζ, 0,−10, 1)
Table 1: The full payoff matrix of the game
The payoffs to P1 and A3 are constantly equal to 2 and to 1 respectively, and ζ ≤ −1 is a loss
to P2.10 For the sake of simplicity, we henceforth refer to the reduced matrix below, which only
includes the payoffs to P2, A1 and A2.
3.1 No private communication for principals: feasibility and equilibrium
We first consider the situation in which principals cannot send private signals to agents. In this
context, we fix agents’ message sets to be sufficiently large to include the set of direct mechanisms
that each principal j can post, i.e. Yj ⊆ M ij for i = 1, 2, 3 and j = 1, 2, so that recommendation
10The value of ζ is used to identify the threshold for P2’s payoff along the lines of Yamashita (2010). See Proposition
1 and, specifically, equation (2) for its explicit characterization.
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y21 y22
a¯ a a¯ a
y11 a¯ (95, 10, 5) (ζ, 3/2, 8) a¯ (ζ,−1/10, 0) (ζ,−1/10, 8)
a (−1, 0, 0) (ζ, 0, 10) a (−1, 5, 5) (ζ, 1,−10)
a¯ a a¯ a
y12 a¯ (95, 10, 5) (ζ, 3/2, 8) a¯ (ζ,−1, 4) (ζ,−1, 8)
a (5, 5, 5) (ζ,−1, 4) a (−1, 0, 0) (ζ, 0,−10)
Table 2: The reduced payoff matrix
mechanisms are available to both principals. In the next paragraphs, we characterize the set of
allocations supported by recommendation mechanisms in an equilibrium of this GM game.
We first identify the set of incentive feasible allocations. Since principals do not privately
communicate, a direct mechanism can be conveniently represented by means of four binary dis-
tributions over principals’ decisions, one for each pair of agents’ actions. In what follows, we let
pia1a2 ≡ prob(y11|a1, a2) be the probability with which P1 plays y11 if the actions (a1, a2) ∈ {a¯, a}2
are observed. A direct mechanism for P1 is therefore an array α1 = (pia¯a¯, pia¯a, piaa¯, piaa) ∈ [0, 1]4.
Similarly, we let σa1a2 ≡ prob(y21|a1, a2) be the probability with which P2 plays y21 if (a1, a2) ∈
{a¯, a}2 are observed, and we write α2 = (σa¯a¯, σa¯a, σaa¯, σaa) ∈ [0, 1]4. An (stochastic) allocation
induced by the direct mechanisms (α1, α2) and by the strategies (η1, η2, η3) is a probability distri-
bution over final choices in Y1 × Y2 ×A1 ×A2 ×A3 defined by the array
z =
((
pia1a2
)
(a1,a2)∈{a¯,a}2 ,
(
σa1a2
)
(a1,a2)∈{a¯,a}2 , η
1(.|α1, α2), η2(.|α1, α2), η3(a¯|α1, α2) = 1
)
,
in which ηi(.|α1, α2) denotes the probability distribution over Ai for agent i = 1, 2 given (α1, α2).
We then say that an (stochastic) allocation z is incentive feasible if the strategies (η1, η2, η3) form
an (Nash) equilibrium of the agents’ action game induced by (α1, α2).11 We denote ZIF the set of
incentive feasible allocations. The two remarks below are key for equilibrium characterization.
Remark 1 Any allocation supported in an equilibrium of GM is incentive feasible.
Remark 2 ZIF is non-empty. In particular, it includes the allocation inducing the deterministic
choices (y12, y21, a¯, a, a¯). Indeed, if P1 commits to play y12 for each profile of agents’ actions, and
P2 makes the same commitment to y21, then it is an equilibrium for A1 to play a¯, for A2 to play a
11Yamashita (2010) restricts attention to deterministic allocations. That is, agents play pure strategies in every
continuation equilibrium, and principals cannot randomize over their decisions. Under this restriction, existence of
a continuation equilibrium is not guaranteed. We enlarge the analysis to random behaviors, therefore allowing for
mixed strategy equilibria in each continuation game played by the agents.
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(with A3 playing a¯). This yields the payoffs (2, ζ, 3/2, 8, 1). A similar reasoning guarantees that ZIF
includes the allocation inducing the choices (y11, y22, a, a¯, a¯), which yield the payoffs (2,−1, 5, 5, 1).
Finally, it also includes the allocation sustained by the direct mechanisms in which P1 commits to
play y12 when observing the actions (a, a¯, a¯), and y11 otherwise, and P2 commits to play y21 when
observing the actions (a, a¯, a¯), and y22 otherwise. Given these offers, (a, a¯, a¯) is an equilibrium
of the agents’ action game. The induced choices are (y12, y21, a, a¯, a¯), corresponding to the payoffs
(2, 5, 5, 5, 1).
Remark 1, which directly follows from the definition of incentive feasibility, parallels Lemma 1
in Yamashita (2010). The multiplicity of incentive feasible allocations documented in Remark 2
suggests the possibility of using recommendation mechanisms to derive a folk-theorem result in the
example. This is established in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Every incentive feasible allocation yielding at least −1 to P2 can be sustained in
an equilibrium of the game GM .
Proof. Let each principal j = 1, 2 use the recommendation mechanism γRj as defined in (1). To
develop the proof, we first establish the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If P1 posts the recommendation mechanism γR1 then, for every mechanism γ2 ∈ ΓM22
posted by P2, there exists an equilibrium of the agents’ game yielding P2 at most -1.
Proof. Let P1 post γR1 . For each γ2 ∈ ΓM22 posted by P2, agents play a continuation game over
the messages to send to principals and over their actions. Let the message profile m1 ∈ M1 be
such that agents select in γR1 the direct mechanism α1 ∈ Y1 in which pia¯a¯ = pia¯a = piaa¯ = 1 and
piaa = 0. In addition, let µ denote a probability distribution over the messages sent to P2 and
σµ = (σµa¯a¯, σ
µ
a¯a, σ
µ
aa¯, σ
µ
aa) be the profile of probability distributions over P2’s decisions induced by
such µ, given γ2.
Consider the agents’ action game induced by the mechanisms (γR1 , γ2), given the messages m1
sent to P1 and the distribution µ over the messages sent to P2. In this game, A3 can only take
the action {a¯}, and the strategic interaction between A1 and A2 is represented in Table 3.
The game has no pure strategy equilibrium in which A1 and A2 play (a¯, a¯). Indeed, if A1 plays
a¯, A2 will choose a since 8 > 5σµa¯a¯ for every σ
µ
a¯a¯ ∈ [0, 1]. The following situations may hence arise.
1. The game has a pure strategy equilibrium in which A1 plays a¯ and A2 plays a, with A3
playing a¯. This is for instance the case if σµa¯a ≥ 1/16. The equilibrium yields P2 the payoff ζ ≤ −1.
11
a¯ a
a¯ 11σµa¯a¯ + 910(1− σµa¯a¯)− 1, 5σµa¯a¯ 85σµa¯a − 110 , 8
a 5(1− σµaa¯), 5(1− σµaa¯) −σµaa, 6σµaa − 10
Table 3: Agents’ action game induced by (γR1 , γ2) given m1 and µ.
2. The game has a pure strategy equilibrium in which A1 plays a and A2 plays a, with A3
playing a¯. This is never the case since 6σµaa − 10 < 0 ≤ 5(1− σµaa¯) for every σµaa¯ and σµaa.
3. The game has a pure strategy equilibrium in which A1 plays a and A2 plays a¯, with A3
playing a¯. This is the case if 11σµa¯a¯ + 9/10(1− σµa¯a¯)− 1 ≤ 5(1− σµaa¯) which is for instance satisfied
if σµa¯a¯ = σ
µ
aa¯ = 0. Since piaa¯ = 1, the equilibrium yields P2 the payoff −1.
4. The game has a mixed strategy equilibrium in which A1 plays a¯ with probability φ, A2 plays
a¯ with probability τ , and A3 plays a¯ with probability one. To have at least one player randomizing
at equilibrium it must be that either
8
5σ
µ
a¯a −
1
10 ≥ −σ
µ
aa and 11σ
µ
a¯a¯ + 9/10(1− σµa¯a¯)− 1 ≤ 5(1− σµaa¯),
or
8
5σ
µ
a¯a −
1
10 ≤ −σ
µ
aa and 11σ
µ
a¯a¯ + 9/10(1− σµa¯a¯)− 1 ≥ 5(1− σµaa¯).
The expected payoff to P2 in a mixed strategy equilibrium is:
φτ(95σµa¯a¯ + ζ(1− σµa¯a¯))− (1− φ)τ + (1− τ)ζ,
which is lower than −1 whenever
ζ [φτ(1− σµa¯a¯) + (1− τ)] + τ [φ 95σµa¯a¯ − (1− φ)] ≤ −1. (2)
The term [φτ(1− σµa¯a¯) + (1− τ)] in the left-hand side of (2) is positive and bounded away from 0 in
any mixed strategy equilibrium of the action game.12 In addition, since the term τ [φ 95σµa¯a¯ − (1− φ)]
is bounded above by 95, given σµ, (2) is satisfied for every (φ, τ) ∈ [0, 1]2 if the loss ζ is large enough.
12Indeed, φ is bounded away from zero in any mixed strategy equilibrium, as one can verify by inspection of Table
3. For [φτ(1− σµa¯a¯) + (1− τ)] to be arbitrarily close to zero, one then needs to have σµa¯a¯ converging to one and
inducing an equilibrium in which τ is arbitrarily close to one. Yet, the equilibrium value of τ is decreasing in σµa¯a¯,
and it is bounded away from one when σµa¯a¯ converges to one. Finally, observe that if σ
µ
a¯a¯ = 1 the agents’ action game
only admits a pure strategy equilibrium, in which φ = 1 and τ = 0, and P2’s payoff is exactly equal to ζ.
12
We therefore set ζ = min{−1, ζ¯}. This guarantees that P2 cannot achieve a payoff above −1 in
any equilibrium of the action game induced by a deviation to any mechanism γ2 ∈ ΓM22 , if agents
send messages to P1 selecting pia¯a¯ = piaa¯ = pia¯a = 1, and piaa = 0, and choose the distribution
µ ∈ ∆(M2) to communicate with him.
To complete of the proof of Lemma 1, we argue that, for every γ2, there exists an equilibrium
of the continuation game induced by (γR1 , γ2), in which agents send the message profile m1 to P1,
recommending to select the direct mechanism α1 = (1, 1, 1, 0). That these behaviors are part of
an equilibrium is indeed a direct implication of P1 posting a recommendation mechanism in the
presence of three agents, which guarantees that the majority rule in (1) applies. 
To complete the proof of Proposition 1, we specify the agents’ equilibrium strategies in such a
way that, following each deviation of P2, they recommend α1 = (1, 1, 1, 0) to P1 and coordinate
on a profile of actions yielding P2 a payoff of at most −1. 
The above reasoning reproduces that of Lemma 2 in Yamashita (2010). We argue that the
payoff −1 is the minmax value for P2 over incentive schemes taking into account the subsequent
action game played by agents. Indeed, for each direct mechanism posted by P1, P2 can always
guarantee himself the payoff −1, as clarified in the following remark.
Remark 3 Take any α1 = (pia¯a¯, pia¯a, piaa¯, piaa) ∈ [0, 1]4, and let P2 post a direct mechanism α2
such that σa¯a¯ = σa¯a = σaa = 0. Then, (a, a¯) is the only equilibrium of the agents’ action game.
That is, the game induced by the direct mechanisms (α1, α2), has an equilibrium yielding −1 to P2.
Thus, there is no direct mechanism for P1 which allows to punish P2 with a payoff below −1. In
addition, as shown in the proof of Lemma 1, there is an α1 which prevents P2 from achieving a
payoff above −1 for every direct mechanism α2 she may choose. These observations guarantee that
the minmax payoff value for P2 is exactly −1.
The value −1 also corresponds to the minimal equilibrium payoff for P2 in a complete informa-
tion game in which each principal posts recommendation mechanisms and agents take actions and
coordinate on the worst continuation equilibrium for P2, in analogy with the threshold identified
by Yamashita (2010).13
Key to our analysis is to characterize the maximal payoff that P2 can attain at equilibrium if he
cannot privately communicate with agents. Given Proposition 1, this corresponds to his maximal
payoff computed over the set ZIF and it is characterized in the following lemma.
13See Peters (2014) for a general discussion of the minmax characterized by Yamashita (2010) in terms of the
primitives of a competing mechanism game.
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Lemma 2 The maximal payoff to P2 over all allocations z ∈ ZIF is 5.
Proof. Table 4 below depicts the action game played by A1 and A2 for a given profile of direct
mechanisms, α1 = (pia¯a¯, pia¯a, piaa¯, piaa) and α2 = (σa¯a¯, σa¯a, σaa¯, σaa), recalling that A3 can only play
{a¯}.
a¯ a
a¯ 11σa¯a¯ + 910pia¯a¯(1− σa¯a¯)− 1, 52σa¯a + 910pia¯a(1− σa¯a)− 1, 8
σa¯a¯ + 4(1− pia¯a¯ + pia¯a¯σa¯a¯)
a 5(σaa¯ + piaa¯)− 10σaa¯piaa¯, piaa − σaa,
5(σaa¯ + piaa¯)− 10σaa¯piaa¯ σaa(6piaa + 10)− 6
Table 4: The actions’ game played by A1 and A2, induced by (α1, α2)
As pointed out in Remark 2, there exists an allocation z ∈ ZIF yielding 5 to P2. For P2 to
achieve a payoff strictly above 5, principals’ mechanisms should be designed to induce agents to
choose (a¯, a¯) with positive probability. Yet, in any equilibrium of the above game in which at least
one agent randomizes, the payoff to P2 is smaller than 5. That is:
φτ(95σa¯a¯ + ζ(1− σa¯a¯)) + (1− φ)τ [6σaa¯(1− piaa¯)− 1] + (1− τ)ζ =
ζ [φτ(1− σa¯a¯) + (1− τ)] + τ [φ 95σa¯a¯ − (1− φ)] + τ(1− φ)6σaa¯(1− piaa¯) ≤ 5 (3)
for every mixed strategy equilibrium (φ, τ) induced by any (α1, α2). To establish the inequality in
(3), recall that, by (2), ζ [φτ(1− σa¯a¯) + (1− τ)]+τ [φ 95σa¯a¯ − (1− φ)] ≤ −1 in any mixed strategy
equilibrium. It follows that:
ζ [φτ(1− σa¯a¯) + (1− τ)]+τ [φ 95σa¯a¯ − (1− φ)]+τ(1−φ)6σaa¯(1−piaa¯) ≤ τ(1−φ)6σaa¯(1−piaa¯)−1 ≤ 5
holds for every (α1, α2). To conclude the proof it remains to show that (a¯, a¯, a¯) cannot be an (pure
strategy) equilibrium of the agents’ action game. Indeed, since σa¯a¯ + 4(1 − pia¯a¯ + pia¯a¯σa¯a¯) < 8 for
each (σa¯a¯, pia¯a¯), if A1 plays a¯, A2 strictly prefers to play a. Hence, there is no z ∈ ZIF yielding P2
a payoff strictly greater than 5. 
One should observe that, to achieve his maximal payoff, P2 crucially exploits the possibility to
contract on agents’ observable actions (see Remark 2). If principals’ decisions were not contingent
on agents’ actions, then there would not be a feasible allocation yielding P2 the (maximal) payoff
of 5. Indeed, any such allocation would necessarily involve P1 playing y12 and P2 playing y21 with
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probability one, A1 and A2 playing the pure strategies (a, a¯). One can then check that, given these
principals’ decisions, (a, a¯) would not be an equilibrium of the agents’ action game.
Taken together, Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 imply that recommendation mechanisms support
all incentive feasible allocations yielding a payoff above -1 and at most equal to 5 to P2 in an
equilibrium of the above game GM . This provides an instance of Yamashita (2010)’s Theorem 1 in
a complete information setting in which random behaviors are allowed.14 We remark that the lower
bound of P2’s payoff coincides with −1 in any GM in which the message sets of P1 are sufficiently
rich to include all his direct mechanisms. The upper bound, instead, is equal to 5 regardless of the
size of any principal’s message sets, as the proof of Lemma 2 shows.
3.2 Principals’ private communication: equilibrium analysis
We now consider the situation in which each principal j posts a mechanism with signals γˆj ∈ ΓMjSjj ,
recalling that ΓMjj ⊆ ΓMjSjj . In such enlarged setting, we show that for every mechanism with signals
posted by P1, there is a mechanism with signals yielding P2 a payoff strictly greater than 5. Hence,
none of the allocations characterized in Proposition 1 can be supported at equilibrium. That is,
that the set of equilibrium allocations of any game GMS and the set of those of the corresponding
game GM are disjoint. The result is established in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Consider a game GMS, in which Sij is a finite set and Ai ⊆ Sij for every (i, j).
Let P1 post an arbitrary mechanism γˆ1 ∈ ΓM1S11 . Then, there exists γˆ2 ∈ ΓM2S22 which yields P2 a
payoff strictly greater than 5 in every continuation equilibrium.
Proof. The proof shows that P2 can always attain a payoff greater than 5 by means of a simple
mechanism, in which he sends to each agent a private signal on the action she should take and he
commits to a joint probability distribution over signals and incentive schemes that is not contingent
on agents’ messages. Therefore, γˆ2 is a direct mechanism with signals. Specifically, it prescribes
that:
i.) P2 privately communicates {a¯} to all agents and chooses y21 for every profile of agents’
actions, with probability k > 0;
ii.) P2 privately communicates {a} to A1 and {a¯} to A2 and A3 and chooses y22 for every profile
of agents’ actions, with probability (1− k).
14See also Xiong (2013) for a version of the folk theorem of Yamashita (2010) that does not rely on the restriction
to deterministic behaviors.
15
The mechanism γˆ2 implements the above distribution for every profile of agents’ messages received
by P2. Given the signal she privately receives from P2, each agent i is able to construct the
conditional joint probability over {y21, y22} and signals sent by P2 to her opponents. In particular,
γˆ2 is such that, given her private signal, A1 knows exactly which decision P2 is implementing, while
A2 remains uninformed. We let q 12 (y21, a¯|a¯) be the conditional probability formed by A1 on P2
choosing y21 and signaling a¯ to A2, when she receives a¯ from him.15 Observe that given γˆ2, one
has q 12 (y21, a¯|a¯) = 1 for A1. Similarly, we let q12(y22, a¯|a) be the conditional probability formed by
A1 on P2 choosing y22 and signaling a¯ to A2, when she gets a from him. This is also equal to 1
when P2 commits to γˆ2. All other posteriors probabilities for A1 are null given i.)-ii.).
On the contrary, A2 only receives the signal a¯ with positive probability in γˆ2, which implies
that her posteriors are equal to the priors, i.e. q 22 (y21, a¯|a¯) = k and q 22 (y22, a|a¯) = 1− k.
We now show that γˆ2 yields P2 a payoff greater than 5, for every mechanism γˆ1 ∈ ΓM1S11 posted
by P1. To do so, we have to consider P1’s probability distribution over incentive schemes and
signals as determined by the messages that agents send him in the game induced by (γˆ1, γˆ2). We
denote this joint probability q1 ∈ ∆(Y1 × S1), with S1 = S11 × S21 × S31 .
Given the (private) signal received from P1, each agent i = 1, 2, 3 constructs the conditional
probabilities over incentive schemes in α1 ∈ Y1 and signals to her opponents s−i1 ∈ S−i1 . Specifically,
we let q i1 (α1, s−i1 |si1) be the conditional probability that agent i assigns to P1 choosing the incentive
scheme α1 and signaling the array s−i1 to her opponents, when she receives the signal si1 ∈ Si1.
We develop the argument in two steps. First, we consider distributions in which P1 directly
signals an action to each agent, that is q1 ∈ ∆(Y1 × A1 × A2), recalling that A3 takes only one
action. Then, we extend the proof to the general case in which P1 uses arbitrary signals in Si1 for
every i = 1, 2.16
Step 1. Given (γˆ1, γˆ2), let the agents’ messages select a q1 ∈ ∆(Y1×A1×A2). Then, q i1 (α1, aj |ai)
is the conditional probability that agent i = 1, 2 assigns to P1 choosing the incentive scheme α1
and signaling aj ∈ {a¯, a} to agent j 6= i, when she receives the signal ai ∈ {a¯, a} from P1. In
addition, we denote piα1a1a2 the probability that the incentive scheme α1 assigns to y11 given the
agents’ actions (a1, a2) ∈ {a¯, a}2.
Given (γˆ1, γˆ2), we henceforth refer to the agents’ action game induced by any profile of messages
which select q1. In this game, agents take actions given the realization of principals’ private signals.
15As clarified in Section 3.2, the private signal that agent i receives from principal j is the only relevant information
to construct her posterior probabilities on principal j’s decisions.
16There is no loss of generality in assuming that S31 is a singleton. Indeed, the private signals sent to an agent
affect her opponents’ payoffs only to the extent that they effectively modify her actions.
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We show that playing in accordance with the signal she gets from P2 is a dominant strategy for A1.
That is, she strictly prefers to follow P2’s private signal for every pure strategy chosen by A2 in
the action game. To do so, we consider the four cases corresponding to the possible combinations
of principals’ signals she may receive.
1.) A1 receives the signal a¯ from both principals. Given these signals, and since q 12 (y21, a¯|a¯) = 1,
her expected payoff when choosing a1 ∈ {a¯, a} against the pure action strategy ηˆ2 of her opponent,
is:17
∫
α1
q11(α1, a¯|a¯))
[
piα1a1ηˆ2(a¯) u
1(y11, y21, a1, ηˆ2(a¯)) + (1− piα1a1ηˆ2(a¯)) u1(y12, y21, a1, ηˆ2(a¯))
]
dα1
+
∫
α1
q11(α1, a|a¯)
[
piα1a1ηˆ2(a) u
1(y11, y21, a1, ηˆ2(a)) + (1− piα1a1ηˆ2(a)) u1(y12, y21, a1, ηˆ2(a))
]
dα1, (4)
in which, with some abuse of notation, we let ηˆ2(s) ∈ {a¯, a} be the action that the strategy ηˆ2
prescribes to A2 when receiving the signal s ∈ {a¯, a} from P1. We now determine A1’s optimal
actions given her beliefs on A2’s behavior, which leads to consider the following four sub-cases.
1a.) ηˆ2 prescribes to A2 to play a¯ for every signal she receives from P1, i.e. ηˆ2(a¯) = ηˆ2(a) = a¯. In
this case, one can check from Table 2 that A1 gets
∫
α1
10
(
q11(α1, a¯|a¯) + q11(α1, a|a¯)
)
dα1 by playing
a¯, and she would get
∫
α1
5(1 − piα1aa¯ )
(
q11(α1, a¯|a¯) + q11(α1, a|a¯)
)
dα1 by playing a. Since piα1aa¯ ∈ [0, 1]
for each α1,
∫
α1
10
(
q11(α1, a¯|a¯) + q11(α1, a|a¯)
)
dα1 >
∫
α1
5(1− piα1aa¯ )
(
q11(α1, a¯|a¯) + q11(α1, a|a¯)
)
dα1,
hence, A1 strictly prefers a¯ to a for every q11(α1, a|a¯), q11(α1, a¯|a¯) and piα1aa¯ .
1b.) ηˆ2 prescribes to A2 to play a¯ (a) if she gets the signal a¯ (a) from P1, i.e. ηˆ2(a¯) = a¯, ηˆ2(a) =
a. In this case, A1 gets
∫
α1
[
10q11(α1, a¯|a¯) + 32q11(α1, a|a¯)
]
dα1 by playing a¯, and she would get∫
α1
[
5(1− piα1aa¯ )q11(α1, a¯|a¯)− (1− piα1aa )q11(α1, a|a¯)
]
dα1 by playing a. Since piα1aa¯ and piα1aa are smaller
than one for each α1,
∫
α1
[
10q11(α1, a¯|a¯) +
3
2q
1
1(α1, a|a¯)
]
dα1 >
∫
α1
[
5(1− piα1aa¯ )q11(α1, a¯|a¯)− (1− piα1aa )q11(α1, a|a¯)
]
dα1,
and A1 strictly prefers a¯ to a for every q11(α1, a|a¯), q11(α1, a¯|a¯) and (piα1aa¯ , piα1aa ).
1c.) ηˆ2 prescribes to A2 to play a¯ (a) if she gets the signal a (a¯) from P1, i.e. ηˆ2(a¯) = a,
ηˆ2(a) = a¯. In this case, A1 gets
∫
α1
[
3
2q
1
1(α1, a¯|a¯) + 10q11(α1, a|a¯)
]
dα1 by playing a¯, and she would
17To simplify notation, throughout the proof we deliberately omit to specify the action {a¯} taken by A3 in the
expressions of A1’s and A2’s expected payoffs.
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get
∫
α1
[
−(1− piα1aa )q11(α1, a¯|a¯) + 5(1− piα1aa¯ )q11(α1, a|a¯)
]
dα1 by playing a. Since piα1aa¯ and piα1aa are
smaller than one for each α1,
∫
α1
[
3/2q11(α1, a¯|a¯) + 10q11(α1, a|a¯)
]
dα1 >
∫
α1
[
−(1− piα1aa )q11(α1, a¯|a¯) + 5(1− piα1aa¯ )q11(α1, a|a¯)
]
dα1,
which leads to the same conclusion of 1b.).
1d.) ηˆ2 prescribes to A2 to play a for every signal she receives from P1, i.e. ηˆ2(a¯) = ηˆ2(a) =
a. In this case, A1 gets
∫
α1
3/2
[
q11(α1, a¯|a¯) + q11(α1, a|a¯)
]
dα1 by playing a¯, and she would get
− ∫α1(1 − piα1aa ) [q11(α1, a¯|a¯) + q11(α1, a|a¯)] dα1 by playing a. Since piα1aa is smaller than one for each
α1,
∫
α1
3/2
[
q11(α1, a¯|a¯) + q11(α1, a|a¯)
]
dα1 > −
∫
α1
(1− piα1aa )
[
q11(α1, a¯|a¯) + q11(α1, a|a¯)
]
dα1,
and A1 strictly prefers a¯ to a for every q11(α1, a|a¯), q11(α1, a¯|a¯) and piα1aa .
To resume, upon getting (a¯, a¯) from both principals, it is optimal for A1 to play a¯ for every
A2’s pure action strategy ηˆ2.
2.) A1 receives the signal a from P1 and the signal a¯ from P2. In this case, her expected payoff
can be derived from (4) by substituting (q11(α1, a|a¯), q11(α1, a¯|a¯)) with (q11(α1, a|a), q11(α1, a¯|a)). As
a consequence, to determine A1’s optimal actions one can follow the analysis developed in 1a.)-1d.),
which leads to the conclusion that it is optimal for A1 to follow P2’s signal playing a¯ for every
A2’s pure action strategy ηˆ2.
3.) A1 receives the signal a from both principals. Given these signals and since q 12 (y22, a¯|a) = 1,
her expected payoff when choosing a1 ∈ {a¯, a} for a given pure action strategy ηˆ2 of her opponent,
is
∫
α1
q11(α1, a¯|a))
[
piα1a1ηˆ2(a¯) u
1(y11, y22, a1, ηˆ2(a¯)) + (1− piα1a1ηˆ2(a¯)) u1(y12, y22, a1, ηˆ2(a¯))
]
dα1
+
∫
α1
q11(α1, a|a)
[
piα1a1ηˆ2(a) u
1(y11, y22, a1, ηˆ2(a)) + (1− piα1a1ηˆ2(a)) u1(y12, y22, a1, ηˆ2(a))
]
dα1, (5)
in which, we again abuse notation and let ηˆ2(s) ∈ {a¯, a} be the action that the strategy ηˆ2 prescribes
to A2 when receiving the signal s ∈ {a¯, a} from P1. To determine A1’s optimal actions given her
beliefs on A2’s behavior, we consider again the relevant four sub-cases.
3a.) ηˆ2(a¯) = ηˆ2(a) = a¯. In this case, A1 gets
∫
α1
(
9
10pi
α1
a¯a¯ − 1
) [
q11(α1, a¯|a) + q11(α1, a|a)
]
dα1 by
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playing a¯, and she would get
∫
α1
5piα1aa¯
[
q11(α1, a¯|a) + q11(α1, a|a)
]
dα1 by playing a. Since piα1a¯a¯ and
piα1aa¯ are smaller than one for each α1,
∫
α1
( 9
10pi
α1
a¯a¯ − 1
) [
q11(α1, a¯|a) + q11(α1, a|a)
]
dα1 <
∫
α1
5piα1aa¯
[
q11(α1, a¯|a) + q11(α1, a|a)
]
dα1,
hence, A1 strictly prefers a to a¯ for every q11(α1, a¯|a), q11(α1, a|a) and (piα1a¯a¯ , piα1aa¯ ).
3b.) ηˆ2(a¯) = a¯, ηˆ2(a) = a. In this case, A1 gets− ∫α1 [(1− 910piα1a¯a¯) q11(α1, a¯|a) + (1− 910piα1a¯a) q11(α1, a|a)] dα1
by playing a¯, and she would get
∫
α1
[
5piα1aa¯ q11(α1, a¯|a) + piα1aa q11(α1, a|a)
]
dα1 by playing a. Since
piα1a1a2 ∈ [0, 1] for every (a1, a2) ∈ {a¯, a}2 and for every α1,
−
∫
α1
[(
1− 910pi
α1
a¯a¯
)
q11(α1, a¯|a) +
(
1− 910pi
α1
a¯a
)
q11(α1, a|a)
]
dα1 <
∫
α1
[
5piα1aa¯ q11(α1, a¯|a) + piα1aa q11(α1, a|a)
]
dα1,
and A1 strictly prefers a to a¯ for every q11(α1, a¯|a), q11(α1, a|a) and (piα1a¯a¯ , piα1aa¯ , piα1a¯a , piα1aa ).
3c.) ηˆ2(a¯) = a, ηˆ2(a) = a¯. In this case, A1 gets− ∫α1 [(1− 910piα1a¯a) q11(α1, a¯|a) + (1− 910piα1a¯a¯) q11(α1, a|a)] dα1
by playing a¯, and she would get
∫
α1
[
piα1aa q
1
1(α1, a¯|a) + 5piα1aa¯ q11(α1, a|a)
]
dα1 by playing a. Since
piα1a1a2 ∈ [0, 1] for every (a1, a2) ∈ {a¯, a}2 and for every α1, one has
−
∫
α1
[(
1− 910pi
α1
a¯a
)
q11(α1, a¯|a) +
(
1− 910pi
α1
a¯a¯
)
q11(α1, a|a)
]
dα1 <
∫
α1
[
piα1aa q
1
1(α1, a¯|a) + 5piα1aa¯ q11(α1, a|a)
]
dα1,
which leads to the same conclusion of 3b.).
3d.) ηˆ2(a¯) = ηˆ2(a) = a. In this case, A1 gets
∫
α1
[
9
10pi
α1
a¯a − 1
] (
q11(α1, a¯|a) + q11(α1, a|a)
)
dα1 by play-
ing a¯, and she would get
∫
α1
piα1aa
(
q11(α1, a¯|a) + q11(α1, a|a)
)
dα1 by playing a. Since
[
9
10pi
α1
a¯a − 1
]
< 0
for every piα1a¯a and α1, one has
∫
α1
[ 9
10pi
α1
a¯a − 1
] (
q11(α1, a¯|a) + q11(α1, a|a)
)
dα1 <
∫
α1
piα1aa
(
q11(α1, a¯|a) + q11(α1, a|a)
)
dα1,
and A1 strictly prefers a to a¯ for every q11(α1, a¯|a), q11(α1, a|a) and (piα1a¯a , piα1aa ).
To resume, upon getting (a, a) from both principals, it is optimal for A1 to play a for every
pure action strategy ηˆ2.
4.) A1 receives the signal a¯ from P1 and the signal a from P2. In this case, her expected payoff
can be derived from (5) by substituting (q11(α1, a|a), q11(α1, a¯|a)) with (q11(α1, a|a¯), q11(α1, a¯|a¯)). As
a consequence, to determine A1’s optimal actions one can follow the analysis developed in 3a.)-3d.),
which leads to the conclusion that it is optimal for A1 to follow P2’s signal playing a for every A2’s
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pure action strategy ηˆ2.
Thus, given (γˆ1, γˆ2), A1 has a strictly dominant strategy in playing according to the signal she
gets from P2 in every action game induced by a q1 ∈ ∆(Y1 ×A1 ×A2).
We now turn to A2’s behavior. Recall that since A2 only receives the signal a¯ from P2 with
positive probability, therefore, she effectively forms posterior probabilities only relative to P1’s
decisions and signals.
Consider first the case in which A2 receives the signal a¯ from P1 and P2. Given the equilibrium
behaviour of A1 in the action game, A2 (strictly) prefers to play a¯ rather than a, whenever
∫
α1
[
5k + (1− k)5piα1aa¯
] (
q21(α1, a¯|a¯)+q21(α1, a|a¯)
)
dα1 >
∫
α1
[8k − 10(1− k)] (q21(α1, a¯|a¯)+q21(α1, a|a¯))dα1,
that is, whenever
∫
α1
[
5k + (1− k)5piα1aa¯ + 10− 18k
] (
q21(α1, a¯|a¯) + q21(α1, a|a¯)
)
dα1 =
=
∫
α1
[
(1− k)5piα1aa¯ + 10− 13k
] (
q21(α1, a¯|a¯) + q21(α1, a|a¯)
)
dα1 > 0, (6)
which holds for every piα1aa¯ ∈ [0, 1] if k ∈ (0, 10/13). Consider next the case in which A2 receives
the signal a from P1 and a¯ from P2. Then, we can rewrite the inequality in (6) by substituting
(q21(α1, a¯|a¯) + q21(α1, a|a¯)) with (q21(α1, a¯|a) + q21(α1, a|a)), and reestablish that, if k ∈ (0, 10/13), A2
strictly prefers a¯ to a.
Hence, given (γˆ1, γˆ2) and k ∈ (0, 10/13), and for every q1 ∈ ∆(Y1×A1×A2), the agents’ action
game has a unique equilibrium in which both agents play according to the signal they get from P2,
regardless of the signal received from P1.
The corresponding expected payoff to P2 is 95k − (1 − k) which is strictly greater than 5 for
every k > 1/16. Therefore, setting k ∈ (1/16, 10/13) in γˆ2 as specified i.)-ii.) yields the result.
Step 2. We now consider the case in which P1’s probability distribution over his decisions and the
signals he sends to agents has an arbitrary support in (Y1×S1×S2). That is, q1 ∈ ∆(Y1×S1×S2).
As a consequence, in the corresponding action game, each agent receives more private signals
from P1. This however does not alter the agents’ equilibrium behaviors, as we show in the next
paragraphs.
Let si1 ∈ Si1 be a signal privately sent by P1 to agent i = 1, 2 and s−i1 be any array of signals sent
by P1 to i’s opponent. Then, let ηˆ2(s21) represent the action that the pure strategy ηˆ2 prescribes
to A2 when receiving the signal s21 ∈ S21 from P1, and q11(α1, s21|s11) be the conditional (joint)
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probability formed by A1 on P1’s incentive scheme α1 and signal s21 to A2, having received s11.
In Step 1, we established the result when Si1 is a binary set of signals for every i = 1, 2. We now
show that the analysis straightforwardly extends to arbitrary sets Si1. Consider first A1: we show
that for every profile of signals received from principals, she strictly prefers to play according to
P2’s signal for every action strategy of her opponent. Indeed, for each pure action strategy ηˆ2 of
A2, it is possible to partition the set of P1’s signals to A2 in two sub-sets: one including all signals
that induce A2 to play a¯, the other those inducing to play a. Let S¯21 =
{
s21 ∈ S21 : ηˆ2(s21) = a¯
}
and
S21 =
{
s21 ∈ S21 : ηˆ2(s21) = a
}
be such sub-sets. From the view point of A1, given ηˆ2, everything
happens as if P1’s set of signals to A2 was binary, with the probability of each of these two signals
equal to the sum of the posteriors probabilities of all signals in Si1 inducing a given action, i.e.
q11(α1, a¯|s11) = Σ
s21∈S¯21
q11(α1, s21|s11) and q11(α1, a|s11) = Σ
s21∈S21
q11(α1, s21|s11).
Thus, the optimal behavior of A1 can be characterized by extending the analysis of Step 1 to this
more general scenario. Consider, as an example, the case in which A1 receives the signal a from P2
and s11 from P1: given ηˆ2, her expected payoff by playing a¯ will be−
∫
α1
Σ
s21∈S¯21
q11(α1, s21|s11)
(
1− 910piα1a¯a¯
)
dα1−∫
α1
Σ
s21∈S21
q11(α1, s21|s11)
(
1− 910piα1a¯a
)
dα1, while by playing a it will be
∫
α1
Σ
s21∈S¯21
5piα1aa¯ q11(α1, s21|s11)dα1 +∫
α1
Σ
s21∈S21
piα1aa q
1
1(α1, s21|s11)dα1. Since piα1a1a2 ∈ [0, 1] for every (a1, a2) ∈ {a¯, a}2 and for every α1,
−
∫
α1
[
Σ
s21∈S¯21
(
1− 910pi
α1
a¯a¯
)
q11(α1, s21|s11)− Σ
s21∈S21
(
1− 910pi
α1
a¯a
)
q11(α1, s21|s11)
]
dα1 <
<
∫
α1
[
Σ
s21∈S¯21
5piα1aa¯ q11(α1, s21|s11) + Σ
s21∈S21
piα1aa q
1
1(α1, s21|s11)
]
dα1 (7)
and A1 strictly prefers a to a¯ for every q11(α1, s21|s11) and (piα1a¯a¯ , piα1aa¯ , piα1a¯a , piα1aa ). The inequality (7)
holds for every ηˆ2 and its corresponding S¯21 and S21 sets. The same reasoning applies to the case in
which A1 receives a¯ from P2 and some s11 from P1.
It remains to show that given such equilibrium behavior of A1, A2 (strictly) prefers to play a¯
rather than a regardless of the private signals received from P1. Let s21 ∈ S21 be the private signal
she receives from P1 and s11 ∈ S11 any array of signals that P1 sends to her opponent, and recall
that she receives a¯ from P2. Given the equilibrium behavior of A1, she (strictly) prefers to play a¯
rather than a, whenever
∫
α1
Σ
s11∈S11
q21(α1, s11|s21)
[
5k + (1− k)5piα1aa¯
]
dα1 >
∫
α1
Σ
s11∈S11
q21(α1, s11|s21) [8k − 10(1− k)] dα1.
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The expected payoff to A2 is affected by P1’s signals only through changes in the conditional
probability Σ
s11∈S11
q21(α1, s11|s21). This allows to extend the argument developed in Step 1 to this
general case. Thus, given γˆ1, any mechanism γˆ2 with k ∈ (1/16, 10/13) yields P2 a payoff strictly
above 5. 
The proof establishes that P2 achieves a payoff strictly above 5 in any equilibrium of a game with
signals GMS . To illustrate its logic, it is useful to first consider the degenerate case in which γˆ1 puts
positive probability only on one signal. That is, P1 does not privately communicate with agents.
Then, by posting γˆ2, P2 induces some incomplete information in the agents’ action game. Given
their private signals, A1 and A2 have different posterior probability distributions over the decisions
implemented by γˆ2. In particular, P2 correlates his decisions with the signals in such a way that the
signal received by A1 gives her perfect information, while the one received by A2 is uninformative.
The proof points out that the unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding agents’ action game
induces a stochastic allocation, i.e. a distribution over A, Y1 and Y2, which is not incentive feasible
in the absence of private signals. Thus, γˆ2 yields P2 a payoff greater than 5 even if P1 delegates
to the agents the choice of his incentive scheme, in such a way that they can tailor the punishment
to any P2’s choice.18In other words, mechanisms based on deviation-reporting messages are not
effective to prevent P2 from profitably exploiting private communication.
What if P1 can additionally send private signals to agents? By doing so, he could generate novel
continuation equilibria that harm his opponent, exploiting the correlation between his decisions and
the agents’ actions. In the example, A1’s preferences over actions, for each decision of P2, do not
depend on P1’s decisions neither on A2’s choice. The construction of γˆ2 guarantees that this
feature can be exploited in such a way to induce A1 to follow P2’s signal no matter the signal she
receives from P1. Given γˆ2 and the induced equilibrium behavior of A1, the proof of Proposition 2
shows that P1’s signals do not affect A2’s equilibrium actions either. The result does not depend
on the size of the signals’ spaces of the game GMS .19 Indeed, the proof shows that the reasoning
developed for the case in which P1 uses a simple binary set of signals extends to the case of an
arbitrary number of signals. In addition, the result neither depends on the size of the message set
that each agent uses to communicate with principals. In particular, it holds for anyM ij that is large
18Observe that a payoff greater than 5 does not belong to the convex hull of P2’s payoffs associated to the incentive
feasible allocations of games without signals. Hence, it cannot be generated by adding a public correlation device
to the competing mechanism game analysed in Section 3.1, as done for instance by Peters and Troncoso-Valverde
(2013).
19To simplify exposition, the proof of Proposition 2 is developed for the case of finite signal spaces. Furthermore,
the assumption that Ai ⊆ Sij for every (i, j) is made to guarantee that all principals may send meaningful signals.
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in the sense of Yamashita (2010), that is, it includes all direct mechanisms with signals available
to principals.
Furthermore, given (γˆ1, γˆ2), the agents’ action game exhibits a unique equilibrium for every
message they may send to and signal they may receive from P1, which guarantees that the proof
does not rely on any equilibrium selection argument. That is, there is no “babbling” equilibrium
in which agents ignore P2’s signal.
Thus, none of the allocations characterized in Proposition 1 can be sustained at equilibrium in a
competing mechanism game with signals. A straightforward implication is that equilibria sustained
by mechanisms without signals, such as recommendation mechanisms, fail to be robust. This leads
to the following:
Corollary 1 None of the equilibria characterized in Proposition 1, in which principals post the
recommendation mechanisms (γR1 , γR2 ), is robust to unilateral deviations of P2 towards mechanisms
with signals.
To summarize, any equilibrium allocation of a game GMS , in which signals are non-degenerate
for at least one principal, is not an equilibrium allocation of the corresponding game GM , for every
collection of message sets M . We next show that principals’ private communication plays a role at
equilibrium.
3.3 Principals’ private communication: equilibrium existence
The following proposition establishes, in the context of the example, equilibrium existence for games
with private signals.
Proposition 3 Consider any game GMS in which M ij is arbitrary and Ai ⊆ Sij for every i and j.
The payoffs profile (2, 79, 113 , 5, 1) can be supported in an equilibrium of GMS in which principals
play pure strategies.
Proof. Let P1 commit to a degenerate mechanism with signals, γˆ1, such that for every array of
agents’ messages m1, he plays {y11} for every (a1, a2) ∈ A1 ×A2 and sends to each agent the same
signal {s} with probability one. Given γˆ1, the payoffs to P2, A1 and A2 are reported in Table 5.
Since γˆ1 implements a fixed decision irrespective of messages, signals and agents’ actions, from
the viewpoint of P2 finding his best response amounts to solve a single-principal mechanism design
problem as in Myerson (1982). Hence, an optimal mechanism can be characterized in terms of a
direct mechanism with signals ˆˆγ2, in which P2 commits to the same joint probability distribution
23
y21 y22
a¯ a a¯ a
y11 a¯ (95, 10, 5) (ζ, 3/2, 8) a¯ (ζ,−1/10, 0) (ζ,−1/10, 8)
a (−1, 0, 0) (ζ, 0, 10) a (−1, 5, 5) (ζ, 1,−10)
Table 5: The payoff matrix given γˆ1
on incentive schemes and actions signalled to agents for every profile of received messages. That is,
ˆˆγ2 ∈ ∆(Y2×A). As in the single-principal setting of Myerson (1982), direct mechanisms with signals
are sufficiently rich to incorporate any randomness in the incentive schemes of P2. Hence, when
characterizing an optimal mechanism for P2 one can safely restrict to joint probability distributions
over deterministic incentive schemes and signals for P2. In addition, in the action game induced
by ˆˆγ2 and by the degenerate mechanism γˆ1, it is with no loss of generality to focus on equilibria,
in which each agent follows the signal she privately receives from P2.
Since P2 incurs a loss ζ whenever A2 chooses a, any optimal mechanism for him must put
probability zero on signaling the action a to A2. When designing ˆˆγ2, P2 can exploit the flexibility
of an incentive scheme to alleviate the incentive constraints faced by each of the agents. Indeed, the
support of his mechanism consists of all the possible combinations of the two signal arrays (a¯, a¯) and
(a, a¯) with all deterministic incentive schemes. To simplify notation, let us denote q2(α, a¯, a¯) ≡ k¯(α)
and q2(α, a, a¯) ≡ k(α) the joint probabilities attributed by ˆˆγ2 to the incentive scheme α ∈ YD2 , with
YD2 ⊂ Y2 being the set of deterministic incentive schemes, and to any of the two relevant profiles
of signals.
We next consider the agents’ incentive constraints. As for A1, when she gets the signal a¯
from P2, the expected payoff from taking the action a¯ has to be no lower than the payoff from
taking a, given the belief on A2’s obedience to P2. The inequality should be satisfied for each α
implemented by ˆˆγ2 with positive probability when a¯ is sent to A1. This in turn generates a set of
incentive constraints for A1. We now show that it is optimal for P2 to assign a positive probability
k¯(α) only to those incentive schemes α that implement the decision y21 for every action chosen by
A1 when A2 chooses a¯. That is, to any α such that α(a¯, a¯) = α(a, a¯) = y21. The corresponding
incentive constraint for A1 is
k¯(α)
Σ
α′′∈YD2
k¯(α′′)
10 ≥ 0, (8)
in which Σ
α′′∈YD2
k¯(α′′) denotes the marginal probability of receiving the signal a¯ for A1 and zero
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is the payoff corresponding to the choice a. Indeed, any incentive scheme α such that either
α(a¯, a¯) 6= α(a, a¯) or α(a¯, a¯) = α(a, a¯) = y22 induces an incentive constraint for A1 when she
receives a¯ that is different from (8). Yet, one can check that every k¯(α) satisfying any of those
constraints also satisfies (8), but the converse may not be true. This implies that, when designing
ˆˆγ2, P2 finds optimal to set k¯(α) > 0 only for those α such that α(a¯, a¯) = α(a, a¯) = y21. By doing
so, P2 effectively neutralizes the incentive constraints of A1 when she receives the signal a¯.
The set of incentive constraints for A1 when she receives a from P2 can be analyzed in the
same way. Specifically, we show that, in this case, it is optimal to put a positive probability k(α′)
only on those α′ such that α′(a¯, a¯) = α′(a, a¯) = y22. Indeed, the corresponding incentive constraint
for A1 would be
k(α′)
Σ
α′′∈YD2
k(α′′)5 ≥
k(α′)
Σ
α′′∈YD2
k(α′′)(−
1
10). (9)
Once again, we remark that any incentive scheme α′ such that either α′(a¯, a¯) 6= α′(a, a¯) or α′(a¯, a¯) =
α′(a, a¯) = y21 induces an incentive constraint for A1 when she receives a that is different from (9).
Yet, one can check that every k(α′) satisfying any of those constraints also satisfies (9), but the
converse may not be true. This implies that, when designing ˆˆγ2, P2 finds optimal to set k(α′) > 0
for those α′ such that α′(a¯, a¯) = α′(a, a¯) = y22 therefore neutralizing the incentive constraints of
A1 when she receives the signal a.
An optimal mechanism for P2 hence consists of a distribution (k¯(α), k(α′)) which assigns probability
k¯(α) to any α such that α(a¯, a¯) = α(a, a¯) = y21 together with signals (a¯, a¯) and probability k(α′)
to any α′ such that α′(a¯, a¯) = α′(a, a¯) = y22 together with signals (a, a¯).
Let us now consider the incentive constraints of A2. Since she only gets the signal a¯ from P2,
she cannot update her prior probabilities. Thus, given ˆˆγ2, her decisions depend on k¯(α) and k(α′).
We now show that it is optimal for P2 to set α(a¯, a) = y21 and α′(a, a) = y22. In this case, an
incentive constraint for A2 can be written as
k¯(α)
K(α′′)5 +
k(α′)
K(α′′)5 ≥
k¯(α)
K(α′′)8 +
k(α′)
K(α′′)(−10) (10)
in which K(α′′) ≡ Σ
α′′∈YD2
k¯(α′′) + k(α′′) = 1 denotes the marginal probability of receiving the
signal a¯ for A2. Observe that the left-hand side of (10) is fully determined by the conditions on
α(a¯, a¯) = y21 and α′(a¯, a¯) = y22 specified above. In addition, one can check that the expression on
the right-hand side is only affected by α′(a, a), and it is minimized when α′(a, a) = y22.
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We complete the description of an optimal mechanism ˆˆγ2 specifying the decision that α asso-
ciates to the agents’ actions (a, a), and the decision that α′ associates to the actions (a¯, a). With
no loss of generality, we set α(a, a) = y21 and α′(a¯, a) = y22. Indeed, neither A1 nor A2’s incen-
tive constraints are affected by these decisions and P2’s payoff is constant and equal to ζ over his
decisions when A2 chooses a.
Thus, when P1 posts the degenerate mechanism with signals γˆ1, it is optimal for P2 to post ˆˆγ2
which involves a correlation between signals and (uncontingent) incentive schemes. The correspond-
ing correlated distribution implemented by ˆˆγ2 reduces to the two joint probabilities q2(α, a¯, a¯) = k¯
and q2(α′, a, a¯) = k, with α(a1, a2) = y21, α′(a1, a2) = y22 for all (a1, a2) ∈ {a¯, a}2 and k = 1 − k¯.
Therefore, the constraints in (8), (9) and (10) become:
10k¯ ≥ 0 which holds for every k¯ ≥ 0
5k ≥ − 110k which holds for every k ≥ 0
5(k¯ + k) ≥ 8k¯ − 10k. (11)
An optimal mechanism with signals for P2 should maximize his expected payoff V2 = 95k¯ − k
subject to (11). The unique solution involves k¯ = 1518 and k =
3
18 , yielding P2 a payoff of
95k¯ − k = 79 > 5. (12)
The corresponding equilibrium payoffs for all players are (2, 79, 113 , 5, 1) as claimed. 
The result shows the existence of equilibrium payoffs that do not belong to the set characterized
in Proposition 1. The proof of Proposition 3 crucially exploits the fact that P1’s equilibrium
strategy consists of a degenerate mechanism. This in turn allows to restrict attention to direct
mechanisms with signals for P2. That is, given P1’s strategy, for every set of agents’ messages
and principals’ signals, any allocation which is optimal from the viewpoint of P2 can be supported
by letting P2 privately recommend an action to each agent, and requiring agents to obey such
recommendations. Characterizing an optimal mechanism in this class is quite involved since one
has to consider the set of joint probability distributions over incentive schemes and signals sent to
A1 and A2.
One should observe that the mechanism ˆˆγ2, which is optimal given that P1 plays γˆ1, turns out
to be formally equivalent to the direct mechanism with signals for P2 exhibited in the proof of
Proposition 2. This allows to directly relate the result of Proposition 3 with that of Proposition 2.
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The proof of Proposition 3 shows that, if P1 posts the degenerate mechanism {y11}, and A1 plays
in accordance to the signal received from P2 , then any k¯ ≤ 1518 induces A2 to play a¯. To establish
Proposition 2, instead, we have to identify the values of k¯ which yield the same implications for all
mechanisms posted by P1. As shown in (6), this requires setting k¯ < 1013 <
15
18 , which implies that
the corresponding payoff to P2 is bounded above by 951013 − 313 = 94713 < 79.
The same reasoning followed in the proof of Proposition 3 can be iterated to determine the
optimal (equilibrium) mechanism of P2 were P1 posting any other deterministic mechanism inde-
pendent of messages and signals. For instance, if P1 commits to the degenerate mechanism {y12},
it can be shown that an optimal mechanism for P2 yields him a payoff of 80.20 This shows that,
in the context of the example, any GMS game exhibits multiple equilibrium allocations.
4 Discussion
1. Our analysis has two main implications. On the one hand, the equilibria of any game GM are
not robust to unilateral deviations of a principal to mechanisms with signals. This suggests that the
general construction derived in Epstein and Peters (1999) may fail to reproduce all communication
opportunities between principals and agents. On the other hand, none of the equilibrium allocations
of a game in which all principals can privately communicate can be supported at equilibrium when
this private communication is unfeasible. This suggests that the restriction to one-sided private
communication is key to establish folk-theorem-like results in the spirit of Yamashita (2010).
2. We consider the simple scenario in which there is no (exogenous) incomplete information and
agents take fully observable actions. Introducing observable actions is a convenient way to model
agents’ participation decisions, as also done by Epstein and Peters (1999).21 Indeed, our example
can be casted in the two-agents framework of Epstein and Peters (1999), in which each agent
is restricted to participate with at most one principal and communication is not constrained by
participation decisions. To do so, one should interpret the action a¯ as participating with P1 but not
with P2, the action a symmetrically, and let the strategy of not participating with either principal
be dominated.
The possibility for principals to take decisions contingent on agents’ actions is not crucial for our
result. First, as remarked in Section 3.1, in the absence of principals’ private communication any
feasible allocation yields P2 a payoff smaller than 5. This is a fortiori true when agents’ actions are
20The detailed derivation of this result is available from the authors.
21See Epstein and Peters (1999), pp. 123-125.
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not observable. In this case, a direct mechanism for principal j is a flat incentive scheme associating
the same decision to all actions, which implies that the corresponding set of feasible allocations is
included in ZIF . Second, the mechanism with signals γˆ2 used in the proof of Proposition 2 allows
P2 to get a payoff greater than 5 without conditioning on agents’ actions.
3. In the light of the former observation, one could wonder whether mechanisms with signals
keep playing a key role in pure incomplete information settings, with agents taking no actions.
This is the situation considered in Yamashita (2010), who postulates that each agent participates
with all principals from the outset. To answer this question, observe that, when information
is incomplete and principals play recommendation mechanisms, agents take two communication
decisions. First, they recommend to each principal the direct mechanism he should post; second,
they simultaneously report a type to each principal. From the viewpoint of a given principal j,
the messages (types) that agents send to his opponents can be seen as hidden actions. Indeed,
by selecting a profile of decisions in each of the direct mechanisms posted by principals −j, such
messages may indirectly affect principal j’s payoff. He may therefore gain by generating uncertainty
among agents when they play their message game, using the same logic of our example. That is,
principal j may design a mechanism with signals to be privately sent to each agent before he receives
agents’ messages (types). The corresponding continuation equilibrium over messages may induce a
correlation between principals’ decisions that cannot be reproduced without private signals.
4. The example shares with Yamashita (2010) the focus on recommendation mechanisms. An
implication of Proposition 2 is that recommendation mechanisms have a limited power in preventing
P2 from achieving a payoff above 5 at equilibrium if he uses mechanisms with signals. A relevant
issue is whether the result extends to equilibria featuring more sophisticated communication from
agents to principals, possibly involving more than one stage.22 In principle, P1 could exploit the
additional information he may receive from agents to punish P2 in a more effective way. Specifically,
P1 may set up a further round of communication with agents, asking them to communicate the
private information generated by the mechanism with signals γˆ2, and commit to modify his decision
accordingly. This opportunity, however, is not effective in the example since, for any γˆ1, the unique
continuation equilibrium of the agents’ action game induced by γˆ2 is not affected by any further
change in the joint distribution q1.23
22Lemma 2 in Yamashita (2010) guarantees that recommendation mechanisms are sufficiently flexible to reproduce
all the punishments against a deviating principal j which can be generated by arbitrary message spaces of his
opponents.
23We thank Mike Peters for raising this issue to our attention.
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5. The GM game in which eachM ij space is a singleton plays a central role in economic applications.
In this game, which we denote GD, competition between principals takes place absent any private
communication, and principals post direct mechanisms, which are equivalently labelled pay-for-
effort contracts. The game GD provides, in particular, a generalized version of the traditional
models of lobbying of Bernheim and Whinston (1986), Dixit et al. (1997) and Prat and Rustichini
(2003). It is therefore a relevant question from the viewpoint of applications whether the equilibria
of GD survive when principals deviate to more complex mechanisms involving some communication.
Theorem 1 in Han (2007) provides a positive answer, identifying a set of equilibria that are robust
against unilateral deviations to mechanisms with no signals. These are the pure strategy strongly
robust equilibria of GD, that is, the SPNE in which no principal can profitably deviate to a direct
mechanism, regardless of the continuation equilibrium selected by agents.24 Thus, a strongly robust
equilibrium of GD is also an (strongly robust) equilibrium of any GM game. Going back to the
example, recall that there exists an incentive feasible allocation yielding P2 his maximal payoff of
5 (Remark 2). Then, as an implication of Lemma 2, this allocation can be supported in a strongly
robust equilibrium of GD. At equilibrium, P1 plays y12 when observing the actions (a, a¯, a¯), and
y11 otherwise; P2 plays y21 when observing the actions (a, a¯, a¯), and y22 otherwise; A1 plays a, A2
and A3 play a¯, respectively. It hence follows by Theorem 1 in Han (2007) that these behaviors
constitute an equilibrium in any GM game. At the same time, however, the proof of Proposition 2
shows that, if P1 plays the mechanism above, then P2 can profitably deviate to the mechanism with
signals γˆ2. Thus, posting these direct mechanisms does not constitute an equilibrium in a game with
signals GMS . Overall, this suggests that pure strategy equilibria of complete information games
in which principals post pay-for-effort contracts may not be robust against unilateral deviations
towards arbitrary indirect mechanisms.
6. Our result crucially exploits the presence of several agents. In single-agent environments,
following a principal’s deviation to a mechanism with signals, any correlation between the agent’s
actions and his opponents’ decisions can be reproduced using mechanisms without signals.
5 Conclusion
This paper shows that principals’ private communication is key for equilibrium characterization in
competing mechanism games even under complete information. Since principals cannot in general
24See Han (2007), p. 613, for a formal definition of strongly robust equilibria. The result of his Theorem 1 does
not extend to equilibria in which principals play mixed strategies, as he shows in Example 1.
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be prevented from privately communicating with agents, further theoretical work may be needed
to identify a universal set of mechanisms for principals in these contexts.
As a preliminary step, one may want to identify a safe class of mechanisms supporting robust
equilibria. To be relevant for applications, the corresponding messages and signals must be suffi-
ciently simple and tractable. In this respect, a natural candidate is the class of direct mechanisms
introduced in Myerson (1982) for generalized principal-agent problems, which we have here denoted
direct mechanisms with signals. Under complete information, a mechanism in this class requires
that the set of signals available to each principal coincides with the set of agents’ actions. This
choice, however, encounters two main obstacles. The first one is immediate to identify: since an
agent can receive conflicting signals from different principals, there is no obvious counterpart to
the notion of obedience to a principal’s recommendation. This would make the characterization ex-
ercise very complex, since one cannot straightforwardly rely on incentive compatibility constraints
when considering a continuation game played by agents. The second one is more fundamental, and
concerns the robustness of equilibria supported by such simple signals. To describe it, consider a
principal, say j, whose opponents post a direct mechanism with signals. Principal j may find prof-
itable to elicit the agents’ private information embedded in all the signals they receive. To do so,
he would need to make his private communication contingent on each array of opponents’ signals, a
construction that requires an enlarged set of signals for him. In these circumstances, identifying a
robust equilibrium may be very demanding. Indeed, some −j principal may further find profitable
to make his signals contingent on the (contingent) signals of principal j, which potentially leads
to an infinite regress problem similar to that described by Epstein and Peters (1999). The above
considerations constitute a challenge for future research.
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